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ABSTRACT
It is now widely accepted that the techniques of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) are routinely
misused and misinterpreted by researchers seeking insight from data. There is, however, no consensus on
acceptable alternatives, leaving researchers with little choice but to continue using NHST, regardless of its
failings. I examine the potential for the Analysis of Credibility (AnCred) to resolve this impasse. Using real-life
examples, I assess the ability ofAnCred toprovide researcherswith a simplebut robust framework for assess-
ing study findings that goes beyond the standard dichotomy of statistical significance/nonsignificance. By
extractingmore insight from standard summary statistics while offeringmore protection against inferential










The process of turning data into insight is central to the scientific
enterprise. It is therefore remarkable that the most widely used
approach—null hypothesis significance testing (NHST)—has
been subjected to devastating criticism for so long to so little
effect. The emergence of the so-called replication crisis has
catalyzed widespread debate about NHST in general and the use
of p-values in particular (e.g., Nuzzo 2014; Baker 2016). This
debate reached a turning-point inMarch 2016 with the publica-
tion of an unprecedented statement by the American Statistical
Association (ASA) stating that p-values are “commonlymisused
and misinterpreted” (Wasserstein and Lazar 2016) and calling
for researchers to move toward a “post p < 0.05 era.”
However, the statement stopped short of giving specific
recommendations on how this transition should be achieved,
stating only that statisticians “often supplement or even replace
p-values” through, for example, emphasizing estimation,
Bayesian methods, and false discovery rates. This absence of
clear guidance has led to concern that the statement will become
yet another failed attempt to deal with the threat posed by
NHST to reliable scientific inference (see, e.g., Goodman 2016a,
Matthews, Wasserstein, and Spiegelhalter 2017).
In what follows, I examine the potential of the Analysis of
Credibility (AnCred, Matthews 2018) to encourage researchers
to embrace more reliable forms of inference. Its origins lie in
a Bayesian technique for assessing clinical trial outcomes in the
context of existing knowledge (Matthews 2001a, 2001b; Spiegel-
halter, Abrams, and Myles 2004). Its underlying theory has
since found applications in health care evaluation (Spiegelhalter
2004), epidemiology (Rothman et al. 2008), risk assessment
(Greenland 2011), and interpretive issues in inference (Held
2013).
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In the current context, I examine the two features of AnCred
thatmake it potentially attractive to researchers in any discipline
looking to move beyond NHST:
• Its ability to extract more insight from standard summary
statistics, allowing researchers to go beyond the simplistic
true/false dichotomization encouraged by p-values toward a
more nuanced assessment of new findings.
• The enhanced protection it offers against common inferential
misconceptions promoted by NHST and highlighted by the
ASA statement.
I begin by outlining the inferential concepts underpinning
AnCred.
2. The Conceptual Basis of the Analysis of Credibility
NHST dichotomizes findings according to whether or not
they possess statistical significance, as reflected by p < 0.05.
Notoriously, this has become the de facto criterion by which
researchers judge whether a finding is worth taking seriously
or not. As the ASA statement made clear, however, this is
an inappropriate role for the p-value, which bears no simple
relationship to effect size or weight of evidence, and offers no
means of setting findings in context. Furthermore, it encourages
the dangerously false perception that statistically significant
results are in some sense “true,” while nonsignificant results are
“null” or “negative” outcomes.
These deficiencies have led to calls for the research com-
munity to transition from NHST and p-values to greater use
of estimation via confidence intervals (CIs). The latter are
widely recognized as concise but informative summary statistics
(e.g., Rothman 1978; Gardner and Altman 1986). The resulting
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inferential benefits are impressive: the bounds of a CI give
insight into the best-supported magnitude of an effect, together
with its direction and associated uncertainty—none of which
flows directly from a p-value. CIs are also better suited to
the aggregation of insight and the replication of findings,
being more readily combined than p-values, and giving a
more intuitive measure of the probability of replication (e.g.,
Cumming 2008).
While the use of estimation methods is growing, such is the
grip ofNHST that CIs are routinely converted back into p-values
or simply inspected to check their bounds exclude no effect.
As a result, most of their inferential content is thrown away.
In addition, the meaning of CIs under the NHST paradigm is
routinelymisunderstood in ways similar to that of p-values (see,
e.g., Hoekstra et al. 2014; Greenland et al. 2016).
AnCred is based on the pragmatic view that if the research
community is to move beyond NHST, it requires inferential
tools that are widely applicable, simple to use, and less prone
to misinterpretation. To achieve these goals, AnCred shifts the
focus of inference away from null hypothesis testing and toward
effect size estimation relevant to the substantive hypothesis, with
findings assessed via the concept of credibility.With its origins in
Bayesian inference, credibility reflects both the evidential weight
of a finding, as captured by the so-called likelihood, and the level
of support for the finding provided by existing knowledge as
reflected by a prior distribution. Bayesian inference then usually
combines this prior informationwith the likelihood usingBayes’
theorem leading to a posterior distribution giving the updated
level of evidence for the claimed effect, commonly summarized
as a 95% credible interval. Unlike conventional CIs, this has a
straightforward interpretation, in that there is a 95% probability
this interval contains the true effect size. Thus, if this posterior
credible interval excludes no effect, evidence for a nonzero effect
size is said to be “credible at the 95% level.”
With its use of credible intervals, AnCred thus provides a
bridge between the dominant but flawed NHST paradigm and
the less familiar but more informative methods of Bayesian
estimation. It also allows the familiar summary statistic of CIs
to be retained but with an interpretation in line with the basic
research question: do the data provide credible evidence for the
substantive hypothesis of a nonzero effect?
Any inferential method based on Bayesian techniques
must confront the so-called problem of priors: the vulnera-
bility of inferences to choices of prior distributions biased—
unconsciously or otherwise—to give a desired outcome. This
has long been seen as a major challenge to the general
acceptance of Bayesian methods, and has prompted a variety
of methods for dealing with it (e.g., Spiegelhalter, Abrams, and
Myles 2004). The approach used in AnCred is to obviate the
need to specify a prior by deducing it from the data (Good
1950; Carlin and Louis 1996). To do this, Bayes’ theorem is
inverted and the prior deduced subject to the requirement
that when combined with the likelihood it leads to a posterior
distribution that excludes no effect. The resulting prior can then
be compared with existing evidence to see if it can be justified
in the light of what is known. If this is the case, the new finding
can be deemed credible evidence of a nonzero effect.
The comparison required by AnCred can be performed in a
variety of ways: using CIs to summarize prior evidence from
meta-analyses or systematic reviews of previous studies, or
ranges based on plausibility arguments. AnCred facilitates the
comparison by virtue of maintaining a consistent format for the
summary statistics throughout the analysis; for example, if the
finding is stated as a 95% CI for an odds ratio (OR), AnCred
gives the necessary prior in the same terms. The outcome is a
principled and quantitative assessment of the new finding in the
context of what is known—in marked contrast to the cursory
and qualitative discussion sections typically accompanying
NHST-based studies.
As AnCred allows the prior needed for credibility to
extracted objectively from the likelihood, concerns about priors
being hand-picked to achieve a desired outcome do not arise.
Simply put, if a finding is shown to require a level of prior
support not found in the existing knowledge base, that finding
does not provide credible evidence for a non-zero effect. While
selective use of the knowledge base remains possible, AnCred
readily exposes such practices and allows the impact of less
favorable supporting evidence to be easily determined.
In the case of entirely unprecedented findings, however, com-
parison with appropriate prior insight may not be possible. In
such instances, AnCred assesses the credibility of the finding
using the only evidence available: the finding itself. Such intrin-
sic credibility is determined using a criterion given in the next
section, whose basis is explained in the Appendix.
With credibility as its defining concept, AnCred encourages
a transition away from unthinking dichotomization based on
statistical significance. This practice reflects the widespread, but
erroneous, belief that p < 0.05 is a universally valid criterion
for the reality of an effect, regardless of context. AnCred, in
contrast, assesses findings on the basis of their credibility, which
depends not only on evidential weight, but also support from
prior insight. As such, it discourages the belief that findings in
isolation can be relied on to demonstrate the truth or otherwise
of a hypothesis. The assessment of credibility is necessarily
context-dependent and thus open to quantitative challenge and
debate by the relevant research community, rather than simple
declaration by those responsible for the finding.
The theory and modelling assumptions underpinning the
above features of AnCred are summarized in the Appendix. As
the remit of this Special Issue is to explore practical suggestions
for transitioning to the post p < 0.05 era, the rest of this article
will focus on assessing the extent towhichAnCred addresses the
real-life challenges involved in making that transition.
3. How AnCred Is Applied in Practice
Any proposal for encouraging changes in inferential practice
must accept the ubiquity of NHST. From the training of new
researchers through to the stipulations of leading journals, the
concepts of p-values, statistical significance and nonsignificance
look set to remain widely used for the foreseeable future, what-
ever their failings. Pragmatism suggests, therefore, that the best
hope of achieving a change in practice lies in offering inferential
tools that can be used alongside the concepts of NHST, adding
value to them while mitigating their most egregious features.
The formalism of AnCred is aligned with this view. Opera-
tionally, it proceeds as follows:
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1. The study finding is summarized using standard methods as
a 95% CI (L, U); this represents the likelihood, with point
estimateM.
2. This likelihood is then used to deduce the range of prior
effect sizes which, when combined with the likelihood, lead
to a posterior range that just excludes no effect at the 95%
level. The resulting critical prior interval (CPI) is used to
assess the credibility of a finding, according to whether it is
statistically significant or not. The appropriate formulas for
calculating the CPI in each case are found in the Appendix.
For example, if the effect size is stated as a difference inmeans
or proportions, the CPI for statistically significant findings
is (-SL, +SL), where SL is the skepticism limit calculated
from the likelihood (L,U) via Equation (A1). For statistically
nonsignificant findings, the CPI is (0, AL), where AL is the
advocacy limit (AL) given by Equation (A3).
3. To assess the credibility of the finding underAnCred, this CPI
is compared with effect sizes supported by prior evidence,
in the form of CIs or plausible ranges (see Appendix). The
criteria used depend on whether the finding is statistically
significant, nonsignificant or is unprecedented:
• For statistically significant results: if prior evidence sup-
ports effect sizes at least as large as the calculated SL,
the finding is both statistically significant and provides
credible evidence for a nonzero effect.
• For statistically nonsignificant results: if prior evidence
supports effect sizes lying within the advocacy CPI, the
finding provides credible evidence of a nonzero effect size,
despite being nonsignificant.
• For unprecedented results for which no appropriate prior
evidence exists, a finding is both statistically significant
and intrinsically credible if the point value M of the 95%
CI lies outside the calculated CPI.
The examples that follow show how these criteria are applied
in practice. As we shall see, one striking feature of the use of
AnCred it that statistically significant findings can nevertheless
lack credibility, for example, because their evidential weight is
too weak to compensate for their implausibility as indicated
by prior evidence. Similarly, statistically nonsignificant results
can still provide evidential support for nonzero effects, and
provide useful constraint on plausible effect sizes. This high-
lights the feature of NHST so often overlooked by researchers,
and highlighted by the ASA statement: statistical significance
and nonsignificance are unreliable indicators of the presence or
absence of genuine effects.
To illustrate the ability of AnCred to bring more inferential
power to bear on research questions, I now give some repre-
sentative worked examples. To fix ideas, these are in the form
of prototypical findings whose effect size is summarized by a
95% CI for an OR, the substantive hypothesis being that the OR
exceeds unity.
Example 1. OR = 1.57 (1.12, 2.21). This is a statistically sig-
nificant finding (p = 0.01). To assess whether it also provides
credible evidence for a genuine effect, we turn to AnCred and
calculate the appropriate CPI from the summary CI. For statis-
tically significant ORs, we use (A2) to calculate the SL, which in
this case is 1.47. Thus, for this finding to be deemed credible,
AnCred requires that there is prior evidence for plausible ORs
at least as large as this; for example, if the prior evidence for a
positive effect is summarized by a CI of (Lo,Uo), thenwe require
Lo > SL. This might be entirely reasonable in some contexts,
for example, the outcome of a new educational intervention;
in such cases we may conclude that the finding provides both
statistically significant and credible evidence for a nonzero effect
at the 95% level. However, in other contexts—for example, an
increase in environmental cancer risk—such an SL may be
highly implausible. Either way, AnCred has moved the assess-
ment beyond the standard simplistic true/false dichotomization
to a discussion based on both the weight of evidence from the
new finding and the context as set by prior knowledge.
Example 2. OR = 1.57 (1.03, 2.40). This finding has the same
central effect size as before and is again statistically significant
(p = 0.04). This much is clear simply by noting the point
estimate and also that the range excludes no effect. However,
this common practice overlooks a crucial difference from the
previous example: the CI is considerably wider and its lower
bound runs closer to no effect; as such it represents a weaker
level of evidence for a positive effect. AnCred quantifies this,
with Equation (A2) leading to an SL of 3.0. Thus, the finding is
now only credible evidence for a positive effect if there is prior
evidence that plausible ORs are at least as large as 3.0. So, for
example, if the prior evidence is summarized by a CI of (Lo,Uo),
then Lo > 3.0. Intuitively, the more demanding SL reflects the
fact that this study provides weaker evidence than the previous
example, and thus needs more support from prior evidence to
achieve credibility.
If the finding concerned an entirely novel effect for which
no clearly relevant prior evidence exists, then the concept of
intrinsic credibility applies. In this case, we see that the point
value M of the CI—and thus best-supported effect size—is an
OR of 1.57 which is lower than the SL, and lies within the
skepticismCPI of (1/3.0, 3.0). Thus, for an entirely novel finding,
this level of evidence would be statistically significant but not
intrinsically credible support for a genuine effect.
Example 3. OR = 2.03 (1.03, 4.00). This has the same level of
statistical significance as the previous example (p = 0.04), but a
higher point estimate. Many researchers would thus regard it to
be amore impressive finding. However, this again highlights the
failings of the common practice of focusing solely on the point
estimate and whether the CI excludes no effect. With its upper
boundof 4.00 theCI is considerablywider than before, reflecting
its lower evidential weight. AnCred reflects this, with (A2) now
showing that, despite having the same p-value as before, the
wider CI leads to a much more demanding SL: prior evidence
that ORs exceed SL ∼ 10 is now needed to achieve credibility.
AnCred has here highlighted the fact that findingswith the same
p-value do not necessarily provide the same evidential weight.
Example 4. OR= 1.57 (0.93, 2.65).This result has the same point
value as the first two examples, but is formally nonsignificant.
Furthermore, its p-value of 0.09 lies in the range 0.05 ≤ p ≤
0.10 often characterized by euphemisms such as “approaching
significance,” “marginally significant,” etc. Such findings often
prompt researchers to try to claim support for their substantive
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hypothesis by blurring the normally sharp cut-off for statis-
tical significance. In contrast, AnCred provides a principled
approach to such cases, unpacking the evidential content of
the CI and showing the implications. In this example, it con-
firms the intuition that despite being nonsignificant, there is
some evidence for a positive effect here, as reflected by its
point estimate exceeding unity. AnCred goes further, however,
and reveals the weakness of this evidence. Putting the 95% CI
into (A4) shows that the advocacy CPI is (1, 1100). This is
extremely broad, implying that essentially any prior evidence
for a positive effect will suffice to make the finding credible
support for such an effect, despite its nonsignificance. That is,
the width of the CPI is warning that the finding adds essentially
nothing to what is already known from prior evidence. As such,
claims that its “marginal” significance adds to the evidence for
a positive effect are questionable. Even less justifiable, however,
would be the common interpretation of any such nonsignificant
finding as indicating the absence of any effect at all. Only more
evidential weight from additional data can bring the required
clarity.
This is in marked contrast to Example 2, whose 95% CI has
the same point estimate but is both tighter and entirely excludes
no effect, reflecting its much greater evidential weight. This
leads to a CPI putting much greater constraint on those seeking
to challenge its credibility as evidence of a positive effect.
Example 5. OR = 1.10 (0.80, 1.5). With a p-value of 0.57, this
strongly nonsignificant result would typically be dismissed by
many researchers as powerful evidence of the absence of an
effect. As such, it may be given only scant attention in a paper, or
indeed remain unpublished. AnCred shows that both responses
are inappropriate. Hints of this can be seen simply by inspection
of the CI: the central effect is in the direction of a positive effect,
and the CI is tighter than in the previous example, suggesting
it still carries evidential weight for a positive effect. AnCred
confirms this: from Equation (A4) the stated 95% CI leads to
AL = 1.5. Thus, despite its nonsignificance, the finding provides
credible evidence of a positive effect if prior evidence supports
effect sizes lying in the advocacy CPI of (1.0, 1.5). This is much
tighter than the previous CPI, despite the similarity of effect size
and p-value, essentially because the 95% CI is tighter and the
lower bound is further in the direction of a negative effect (ORs
< 1.0). It thus puts more constraint on prior effect sizes able to
produce credible evidence of a positive effect. Specifically, prior
evidence for effect sizes wholly within the advocacy CPI of (1.0,
1.5)—for example, summarized by a 95% CI of, say, (1.2, 1.4)—
will make the finding credible evidence of a positive effect at
the 95% level, despite being nonsignificant. More diffuse prior
evidence lacks the “heft” needed to achieve this, even if its upper
bound substantially exceeds AL. For example, prior evidence
summarized by (1.2, 4.0) is too diffuse to make the finding of
a positive effect credible.
AnCred is, however, based on conservative criteria which
guarantee credibility when met. Findings may thus still be ren-
dered credible by prior evidence lying outside the AL if it carries
sufficient heft—that is its range is sufficiently tight, for example a
95% CI of (1.8, 5.0). Such situations may encourage researchers
to perform a specific Bayesian calculation to make their case.
However, in doing so, they must also justify going outside the
conservative framework of AnCred. Either way, in this example
AnCred highlights the inadvisability of simply dismissing non-
significant findings as “negative.” Once set in the context of prior
knowledge, even strongly nonsignificant findings can provide
credible evidence for nonzero effects.
Example 6. OR = 0.84 (0.45, 1.55). This has the same non-
significant p-value as before (0.57), but now the point estimate—
0.84—contradicts the substantive hypothesis of OR > 1. In
such cases, there is no CPI capable of turning this into credible
evidence for a positive effect. However, AnCred confirms the
intuition that such findings do support the existence of a neg-
ative effect. To see this, the advocacy CPI is simply reversed to
(AL, 1), consistentwith a substantive hypothesis ofOR< 1, with
AL now calculated using the reciprocal of (A4). We then find a
CPI of (0.46, 1), implying that the finding is credible evidence
for OR < 1 if prior evidence exists for effect sizes lying wholly
in this range. AnCred has here highlighted the fact that while a
study may not support the expected substantive hypothesis, this
does not imply it supports the complete absence of any effect,
and/or should therefore be discarded.
As with the previous example, if the conservative criteria
of AnCred are relaxed, prior evidence for effect sizes lying
beyond the AL may also render the finding credible; this can
be investigated via a standard Bayesian analysis.
These prototypical examples illustrate how AnCred goes
beyond the standard dichotomy of NHST, extracting additional
insight from findings and providing a basis for quantitative
discussion of their implications. I now examine the potential
for AnCred to offer enhanced protection against the inferential
traps highlighted by the ASA in its 2016 statement.
4. AnCred as aMeans of Avoiding Inferential Fallacies
The misconceptions surrounding NHST and p-values are so
numerous there have been several attempts to curate them.
Goodman (2008) focuses on a “Dirty Dozen,” while the authors
of the Supplement to the ASA’s 2016 statement identified more
than 20 (Greenland et al. 2016). Many of these misconceptions
can be avoided by moving from NHST to estimation; how-
ever, as we have seen, this alone is not enough. The use of
AnCred provides extra protection against inferential fallacies
by reducing the opportunities for them to arise in the first
place.
4.1. Misinterpretation of p-Values and CIs
The most notorious inferential error in NHST is the interpre-
tation of a p-value as the probability that the null hypothe-
sis is true. This and related fallacies have been promulgated
even by statistical texts (for a review, see Hubbard 2016a). It
is widely held that estimation and CIs are less prone to such
misinterpretations. However, they are certainly not immune,
with standard CIs often being interpreted as the range within
which the true effect size lies with specified probability. This
interpretation is valid only within a Bayesian framework, under
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which CIs become credible intervals with uninformative priors.
By explicitly using the Bayesian framework, the use of AnCred
obviates this interpretative issue.
4.2. Misappropriation of CIs in Dichotomization
Despite their role in estimation, CIs are commonly hijacked
for use in NHST, in which the focus is simply on whether the
CI includes values corresponding to no effect. This in turn
leads to the notorious practice of taking the resulting dichotomy
of statistical significance/nonsignificance as equivalent to the
truth or falsity of the substantive hypothesis. In contrast to this
inferentially wasteful and misleading practice, AnCred makes
full use of the content of the CI, generating SLs and ALs that
allow researchers to make more nuanced assessments of the
credibility of new findings in the context of existing insight.
4.3. Misuse of Power in the Interpretation of Study
Findings
Researchers commonly believe that the bigger the sample,
the more compelling the resulting inference. While intuitively
appealing, the limitations of this maxim are less widely known.
This may explain why the concept of statistical power, which
is directly related to sample size, is the source of some of
the most recalcitrant inferential fallacies. Power is frequently
used retrospectively to interpret study findings, despite being
a probabilistic concept that lacks meaning once the results
are known (Goodman and Berlin 1994). Researchers hoping
to find a genuine effect from a small study but confronted
with a statistically nonsignificant result frequently ascribe it
to “inadequate” power. Conversely, a nonsignificant outcome
from a study with high retrospective power is often seen as
strong evidence against the existence of the effect.
Such practices have long been criticized without obvious
effect (e.g., Hoenig and Heisey 2001). This suggests that even
if retrospective power is an invalid concept, there is a demand
for ways of assessing the weight of evidence once the findings
are known. AnCred meets this demand via the concept of cred-
ibility. Findings based on small samples typically have wider
CPIs than those from large samples, making claims of statistical
significance/nonsignificance more vulnerable to challenge, as
intuition would suggest. Furthermore, this approach to assess-
ing evidential weight is free from the issues that undermine
retrospective power. However, the expressions (A1)–(A4) also
show that sample size alone is not enough to determine the CPI
in any specific case: both the location of the point estimate of
the CI and the relationship to its width also play a role. As such,
the use of AnCred also offers protection against the counterin-
tuitive phenomenon known as the power fallacy: the belief that
findings from small studies are necessarily less compelling than
large studies (Wagenmakers et al. 2015). To see this, consider the
following real-life example.
Example: Adverse effects of reboxetine. In their systematic review
of adverse effects of this anti-depressant, Eyding et al. (2010)
include two double-blinded, randomized controlled trials with
510 and 210 patients, respectively. The former gave an OR
for adverse effects relative to placebo of 1.73, with 95% CI of
(1.07, 2.79); the smaller study gave a larger point estimate of
4.30, but was also substantially less precise, with a 95% CI of
(1.85, 9.99). Being based on fewer than half the number of
patients, intuition suggests the smaller study is necessarily less
compelling. AnCred shows such reasoning to be a case of the
power fallacy. The application of (A2) shows that the smaller
study has a SL of 1.8, compared with 2.4 for the larger study.
Thus, surprisingly, the smaller study actually provides more
compelling evidence of adverse effects, in the sense of putting
more constraint on skeptics seeking to dismiss the evidence as
not credible. In essence, this is because AnCred makes use of
both the uncertainty surrounding the effect size (i.e., the width
of the CI) and the margin by which it excludes no effect (i.e., the
location of the bounds of the CI relative to no effect) in making
its assessment. AnCred has here highlighted the unreliability of
focusing solely on the width of the CI in assessing the evidential
value of a finding.
4.4. Misuse of Significance as aMarker of “Discordant”
Results
The replication crisis which motivated the ASA statement has
rekindled long-standing concerns over the use of p-values as
guides to the probability of successful replication. For example,
if an initial study obtained the true effect size along with p =
0.05, there is only a 50% probability of getting so impressive a
p-value even from a perfect replication (Goodman 1992). For
the “intuitive” replication probability of 95% to hold, the initial
study must achieve p ≤ 3 × 10−4.
The use ofCIs does less violence to intuition: under ideal con-
ditions, the probability that themean of a replication falls within
the 95% CI of the initial study is 83% (Cumming, Williams,
and Fidler 2004). Nevertheless, CIs remain vulnerable to seri-
ous misconceptions concerning replications. Of these, the most
prevalent is that studies whose CIs encompass no effect are
necessarily discordant with those which exclude it (and vice
versa).
This fallacy is commonly the result of the hijacking of the CI
to serve as a proxy for a p-value. The following case-study shows
how AnCred addresses this fallacy.
Example: The effect of statins on glioma risk. Widely prescribed
for controlling cholesterol, statins appear to have a protective
effect against brain cancers (see, e.g., Gaist et al. 2014). To
investigate this link, Seliger et al. (2016) conducted a large case-
control comparison involving 2469 cases of glioma and a 10-fold
matched control group. The point estimate for cancer incidence
among those receiving statins was anOR of 0.75, consistent with
the protective effect found in earlier studies. Yet despite this,
the 95% CI of (0.48, 1.17) encompassed no effect, leading the
authors to conclude their findings were discordant with these
previous studies.
As Greenland noted in a rejoinder (2017) “Such statistical
misinterpretations have been decried for at least four decades,”
adding that the authors’ error was clearly unintentional, but
nevertheless “undermined their considerable and respectable
effort.” The use of AnCred would have averted this unfortunate
exchange, and also provided more insight into the research
question at issue. Instead of interpreting the findings simply
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via the dichotomy of whether or not the CI includes no effect,
AnCred subjects them to challenge using the CI’s entire infer-
ential content. As the substantive hypothesis under test is for
a reduction of risk, the appropriate CPI is (AL, 1), where AL
is the advocacy limit calculated from (A4). This leads to the
conclusion that Seliger et al.’s interpretation of their nonsignifi-
cant finding can be successfully challenged if there exists prior
evidence of a protective effect in the range (0.14, 1.0). The
authors themselves cite two prior studies with 95% CIs of (0.52,
1.00) and (0.59, 0.98), respectively, both within the required
range. Thus, far from being discordant, Seliger et al.’s finding
adds to the growing evidence in favor of the protective effect of
statins.
4.5. The Inability of p-Values to Incorporate Plausibility
Lacking any direct means of taking account of plausibility, the
NHST paradigm is notoriously capable of lending support to
patently spurious claims (e.g., Hines 1998; Austin et al. 2006;
Bennett, Miller, and Wolford 2009). While often blamed on
practices such as data-dredging, failure to take account of plau-
sibility is more pernicious as it can undermine entire areas of
research (e.g., Bracken 2009; Ioannidis 2013).
By setting new findings in context via Bayes’ theorem,
AnCred captures in quantitative terms the well-known maxim
that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence”
(Sagan 1980). This is especially valuablewhen assessing startling
claims whose statistical significance conceals an underlying lack
of evidential support.
Example: The benefits of prompt administration of clot-busters.
In 1992, a UK-based study suggested that death rates from heart
attacks could be reduced by 50% if the so-called clot-buster drug
anistreplase was given at the scene rather than after arrival in
hospital (GREATGroup 1992). So large a benefit was surprising:
prior experience suggested the reduction in mortality risk was
likely closer to 15–20% (Pocock and Spiegelhalter 1992). How-
ever, the fact that the findings—summarized by an OR of 0.47
with a 95% CI of (0.23, 0.97)—were also statistically significant
(p = 0.04) aroused much interest.
The unreliability of inferences based solely on p-values with-
out reference to plausibility is made clear by the application of
AnCred. This leads, via (A2), to a CPI of (0.1, 1.0), implying the
finding is only credible if there exists prior evidence that prompt
administration leads to at least a 90% reduction in mortality.
This has no basis in reality. AnCred has thus cut through the
statistical significance to focus on the startling lack of evidential
weight behind the headline figure, due to both the width of the
CI and how close it comes to encompassing no effect. However,
the study’s failure to provide credible evidence for an effect does
not imply it is worthless; as with the nonsignificant finding in
the glioma/statin study, it still contains some evidential weight.
As Pocock and Spiegelhalter showed, this can be extracted using
conventional Bayesian analysis, which pointed to a much more
modest effect size similar to that found in a subsequent meta-
analysis (Morrison et al. 2000). In this example, AnCred serves
to alert researchers to the weakness of the original evidence, the
need to avoid using statistical significance as a proxy for the
truth of the substantive hypothesis, and the value in carrying
out a full Bayesian analysis.
4.6. Significance as an Unsafe Basis for Scientific
Conclusions
Goodman (2008) argues that the overarching misconception
about NHST is that statistical significance forms a suitable
basis for scientific conclusions or policy. This has led to the
bizarre situation of each new study often being seen as in
some sense superseding all that went before. While flattering
for researchers and journal editors, this is a parody of the
notion of scientific insight flowing from the accumulation
of reliable evidence. It also threatens trust in the scientific
process among policy-makers and the public alike (Devlin
2017). Nevertheless, the ubiquity of NHST continues to feed
“insights” into the academic and public arena based solely on
statistical significance/nonsignificance. In a final illustration of
the use of AnCred, I examine a recent and controversial example
of the fallacy of using nonsignificance as a proxy for the falsity of
the substantive hypothesis, in breach of the well-known maxim
“Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” (Altman and
Bland 2004).
Example: The effectiveness of stents in angina patients. Intro-
duced in the 1970s and implanted in over 500,000 such patients
each year, stents have long been regarded as plausibly and
observably beneficial to patients with stable angina. This view
has recently been challenged by the outcome of ORBITA, the
first blinded randomized controlled trial of the effectiveness
of stents (Al-Lamee et al. 2018). The primary endpoint was
increased exercise time, which was 28.4 sec for those receiving
a stent, compared to only 11.8 sec for those in the control
group; the summary statistic was the difference of +16.6 sec,
with a 95% CI of (−8.9, 42.0) sec. Despite the point estimate
being consistent with benefit, the nonsignificance of the finding
(p = 0.2) led the researchers to conclude that stents do not
increase exercise time, with positive results from previous
studies possibly being a placebo effect. An accompanying
commentary (Brown and Redberg 2017) went even further,
described the implications as “profound and far-reaching,” with
the findings showing “unequivocally” the absence of benefit
compared to other therapies, and requiring “all cardiology
guidelines to be revised.”
Many cardiologists expressed surprise at the findings. Some
questioned the wisdom of overturning decades of practice on
the basis of a study of 200 patients; others raised technical issues.
Remarkably few commentators noted, however, that the point
estimate of benefit of +16.6 sec is clearly consistent with genuine
efficacy, albeit of questionable value given the risks involved in
stent operations. In addition, the finding was not set in context,
despite its implausibility in light of prior experience and the
relatively broad CI, both of which suggest the nonsignificance
is potentially misleading.
By exploiting the full inferential content of the summary
statistic, AnCred circumvents the “null effect” fallacy encour-
aged by nonsignificant results. It also allows the findings to
be put in quantitative context. Applying (A3) to the summary
CI leads to an AL of +115 sec. So high a level shows that the
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ORBITA evidence, while valuable, is too weak to undermine
the credibility of claims that stents provide clinicallymeaningful
benefit.
Thus, contrary to the impression created by the standardmis-
interpretation of nonsignificance, ORBITA provides no com-
pelling justification for revising cardiology guidelines. Rather, it
points to a small positive level of benefit. This is of course hinted
at by the point value of the 95% CI, but the NHST paradigm
led both the researchers and commentators to focus solely on
the nonsignificance of the finding—that is the location of just
one of the CI bounds—and then misinterpret this as evidence
of no benefit. In contrast, by making full use of the inferential
content of the CI, AnCred allows the result to be in the context
of existing insight. In the process, it counters the misguided
practice of regarding a single, modest but valuable contribution
to knowledge as a dichotomously definitive “fact.”
5. Conclusion
In his commentary to the ASA statement, Goodman (2016a)
states:
“What follows this statement is as or more important than the
statement itself…We need to formulate a vision of what success
looks like, and howwewill get there. If not, we can start drafting
the language of the 2116 ASA statement tomorrow.”
If the statement is to succeed where previous attempts at reform
have failed, the reasons for those past failuresmust be addressed.
The “publish or perish” research milieu encourages the use
of inappropriate inferential practices (see, e.g., Smaldino and
McElreath 2016) as “poor methods get results” (Horton 2015).
Other barriers include a reluctance to move beyond basic statis-
tical training (Schwab et al. 2011) and incredulity that so preva-
lent a technique as NHST can be seriously flawed (Hubbard
2016b).
This article has examined the extent to which the use of
AnCred alongside current practices can overcome these barri-
ers. Using real-life case-studies, I have highlighted the following
practical benefits offered by AnCred:
• It provides researchers with a principled means for going
beyond familiar NHST-based methods, extracting more
insight from them while requiring only modest changes to
statistical training.
• The Bayesian framework underpinning AnCred shifts the
focus of inference to the substantive hypothesis rather than
the null, and leads to straightforward interpretations of find-
ings based on familiar summary statistics.
• This in turn provides enhanced protection against com-
mon but recalcitrant inferential fallacies resulting from using
NHST in isolation.
• Under AnCred, simplistic assessment of evidential weight
based on width of CI or sample size is replaced by a more
nuanced quantitative assessment based on SLs and ALs.
• By “unpacking” the weight of evidence in CIs in this way,
AnCred identifies situations where statistically significant
evidence for a nonzero effect requires an unjustifiable level
of support from prior evidence to achieve credibility.
• AnCred reduces the incentive for practices such as data
dredging and p-hacking by extracting valuable insight from
nonsignificant findings, often dismissed as “null” outcomes.
• This in turn reduces the risk of such findings going
unreported, a notorious cause of publication bias, waste of
research resources, and scientific misconduct.
At the same time, AnCred addresses broader concerns about the
misuse of NHST by the research community:
• By setting new findings in the broader context of existing
insight, AnCred combats the common but false perception of
statistical significance/nonsignificance as synonymous with
the “truth” or otherwise of a substantive hypothesis.
• This in turn encourages the view that, regardless of their
statistical significance/nonsignificance, findings from well-
conducted studies are all contributions to the accumulation
of insight, rather than definitive, standalone conclusions that
supersede all that came before.
• The use ofAnCred ameliorates the so-called replication crisis
by extending the assessment of findings beyond simplis-
tic dichotomization as statistically significant/nonsignificant,
while bringing more clarity to the concept of “discordant”
studies.
• The concepts of SL and AL eliminate the need to use such
flawed notions as “borderline” significance and post-hoc
power to explain disappointingly “negative” study outcomes.
• The combination of evidential weight and prior evidence
used in AnCred subjects weak and implausible claims to
the maxim “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evi-
dence.”
The above features constitute a checklist for comparing
AnCredwith other proposals formoving toward a post p < 0.05
era (e.g., Goodman 2016b; Benjamin et al. 2018; Colquhoun
2018). Like any such proposal, however, AnCred is based on
principles and assumptions that can be challenged. Notably,
it models definitions of fair-minded skepticism and advocacy
using normal distributions, and uses 95% CIs to produce
assessments of credibility at the 95% level. These choices are
pragmatic, in that they lead to computational simplicity and
retain a familiar standard whose ubiquity suggests widespread
acceptability. They are not mandatory, however; as noted in the
Appendix, the principles behind AnCred can be extended to
other distributions and credibility levels.
Perhaps the most obvious potential criticism of AnCred is
that the concept of credibility simply replaces statistical sig-
nificance as a means of dichotomizing findings. However, it
should be stressed that dichotomization per se has never been
the problem with NHST; it is the actions that flow from it. The
categorization of a finding as statistically significant depends
solely on the finding itself, takes no account of context or plau-
sibility and is based on a universal (if widely misinterpreted)
cut-off. As such, statistical significance will sustain a sharp and
incontrovertible dichotomy—a feature which has encouraged
the belief that it is equivalent to the dichotomy of the reality
or otherwise of an effect (Fisher 1929). In contrast, categoriza-
tion of a finding as credible is both conditional and context
dependent. It depends on the size of effect found, its uncertainty,
and its relationship to existing knowledge—which is itself open
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to discussion in terms of selection and aggregation. As such, it
offers no basis for a sharp and incontrovertible dichotomization
based solely on the finding itself. Instead, the credibility of any
given finding is open to debate and challenge by the research
community. Credibility thus reflects the realities of the scientific
enterprise, which approaches truth asymptotically, not peremp-
torily.
It may be argued that AnCred does not go far enough, in that
it stops short of subjecting every finding to a full Bayesian anal-
ysis. The merits of having a standardized conservative frame-
work for assessing new findings should not be under-estimated,
however—not least because it gives continuity with conven-
tional practice, whereby researchers perform an initial assess-
ment of their findings. In any case, AnCred does not preclude
more sophisticated analysis: indeed, it encourages it via its use
of CIs, which are far more informative than p-values. There is
no shortage of guidance on how to perform such analysis—for
those motivated to do so. It is hoped that AnCred will provide
such motivation by showing how even relatively elementary
techniques beyond the NHST paradigm bring major benefits
such as extracting more inferential content from standard sum-
mary statistics, and reduced risk of misinterpretation of the
implications.
AnCred is not merely “quick and dirty Bayes,” however. Its
use of the inversion of the central theorem addresses the long-
standing debate over setting appropriate priors that bedevils
even the most sophisticated Bayesian analyses. The inversion
makes the prior needed to achieve credibility immediately clear
and thus available to all for debate. By moving beyond the use
of uninformative priors or priors based on expert elicitation,
AnCred thus makes more of the inferential power of Bayesian
methods, while increasing their transparency.
This article has examined the application of AnCred to basic
inferential challenges, but there is clearly scope for further devel-
opment, for example, involving different study designs and non-
normal distributions. Using AnCred to re-examine implausible,
“negative” and “discordant” claims based on NHST in the exist-
ing research literature may also prove illuminating.
AnCred is not a panacea for the inferential ills of the research
community. It may, however, encourage researchers to move
beyond NHST and explore the statistical armamentarium now
available to answer the central question of research: what does
our study tell us?
Appendix
What follows is a summary of the theory underpinning AnCred and its
principal results; for full derivations, the reader is referred toMatthews
(2018).
A1:Motivating Principles
AnCred seeks to provide researchers with a simple, intuitive and versa-
tile means of assessing the credibility of effect sizes found by standard
study designs. To achieve these goals, AnCred takes as input the famil-
iar summary statistic of CIs, and extracts from them inferential content
that “adds value” to the standard NHST-based concepts of statistical
significance and nonsignificance. This is done through an inversion of
Bayes’ theorem, allowing the deduction of the prior needed for a given
finding to constitute credible evidence for the existence of an effect, in
the form of a posterior distribution that excludes no effect.
The required inversion is performed with the likelihood and the
prior modelled as normal distributions, widely used to address stan-
dard inferential issues concerning means, proportions and ratios. They
are also conjugate distributions, which in the case of AnCred leads to
closed analytic results requiring no specialized computation. Mathe-
matically, the inversion requires specification of the location and scale
parameters of the prior distribution, and in AnCred this is achieved
by applying the Principle of Fair-Minded Challenge (PFMC) to the two
situations of statistically significant and nonsignificant findings; I now
consider each in turn.
A2: The Case of Statistically Significant Findings
Here the PFMC implies challenging claims to have found a statistically
significant nonzero effect on the basis of fair-minded skepticism. This is
modelled by a prior distribution centered on no effect, but whose tails
reflect the fair-minded concession that there is a finite probability that
a nonzero effect exists. The resulting CPI is shown in Figure A1. For
findings in the form of a statistically significant difference in a mean
or proportion expressed as a CI of (L,U), the CPI has lower and upper
bounds (−SL, +SL) where SL is the skepticism limit given by






A finding provides credible evidence of a nonzero effect if prior evi-
dence exists for minimum effect sizes lying outside the skeptical CPI.
For example, if the prior evidence for a positive effect is summarized
(via, say, a meta-analysis) by a 95% CI of (Lo,Uo), then the finding is
credible at the same level ifLo > SL.As (A1) shows, thewidth of theCPI
is dictated by the evidential weight of the data, as indicated by the width
and location of the CI summarizing the data. The stronger the evidence
of a genuine effect, the tighter the CPI, putting skeptics of an effect
under greater constraint. In colloquial terms, they must invoke more
extreme levels of skepticism about effect sizes to “drag” the posterior
distribution back to the no effect line.
The corresponding expression for statistically significant ratios can
be found by applying the transformation U → ln(U) etc., resulting in









Note that the level of credibility reflected in the SL is set by the summary
statistic: for example, if SL is calculated from a 90% CI, then (A2) is a
90% credibility level, etc.
As the CPI for skepticism is centered on no effect, it represents
a conservative standard for assessing the credibility of a statistically
significant result, reflecting the view that the most likely effect size is
zero. As such, a finding may still be credible if only a proportion of the
prior evidence lies inside the CPI; those wishing to demonstrate this
can make their case via a conventional Bayesian analysis specific to the
findings and prior evidence.
A3: The Case of Statistically Nonsignificant Findings
Here, the PFMC involves challenging a nonsignificant finding on the
basis of fair-minded advocacy of the original substantive hypothesis.
This is modelled by a prior distribution reflecting belief that despite
the nonsignificance, a nonzero effect size still exists, albeit confined
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Figure A1. Under AnCred, statistically significant claims summarized by 95% CIs are subjected to fair-minded skeptical challenge represented by a prior distribution
centered on no effect, whose 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles represent the critical prior interval. Weak evidence for the existence of an effect leads to relatively high skepticism
limits (SLs), giving plenty of scope for skeptical challenge using prior knowledge. Strong evidence, in contrast, leads to tight CPIs, making skeptical challenge more
demanding.
Figure A2. The advocacy prior distribution for assessing claims of statistical nonsignificance summarized by 95% CIs. For substantive hypotheses of a positive effect, the
lower bound of the advocacy CPI is fixed at no effect, while the upper bound—the advocacy limit (AL)—is such that the CPI encompasses 95% of the prior distribution
capable of making the finding credible evidence of a positive effect. Weak evidence against such an effect—that is a broad, nonsignificant 95% CI with a lower bound
pointing to a small negative effect—leads to a relatively broad CPI, as such findings put little constraint on the prior evidence needed for credibility. Stronger evidence
against the substantive hypothesis leads to a tighter CPI, thus constraining advocates to a narrower range of prior support.
to an interval extending from no effect to some finite bound. This
reflects fair-mindedness in the sense that, despite the advocates’ belief
in some level of effect, they concede that its magnitude must have a
finite limit. The resulting CPI is then the range of prior effect sizes
capable of turning the nonsignificant finding into credible evidence for
a nonzero effect. As such advocacy can be of effects either greater or less
than the null, the CPI must reflect the sign as well as magnitude of the
substantive hypothesis. For conciseness, I focus on the case where the
substantive hypothesis implies differences inmeans exceeding zero and
ratios exceeding unity (e.g., better test scores; higher survival rates); the
results where these inequalities are reversed follow by symmetry. The
CPI for nonsignificant differences in means and proportions is then (0,
AL) where AL is the advocacy limit given by
AL = −(U + L)
2UL
(U − L)2. (A3)








the level of credibility again being set by the summary statistic, with
95% CIs leading to ALs for 95% credibility etc. The width of the
advocacy CPI again depends on the evidential weight of the data, such
that the stronger the evidence against a positive effect, the narrower the
CPI; see Figure A2.
If prior evidence points to effect sizes lying wholly within the
advocacy CPI, the finding can be deemed credible evidence for a
nonzero effect, despite its nonsignificance. For example, if the prior
evidence for a positive effect is summarized by an OR 95% CI of
(Lo,Uo) and both Lo and Uo lie within the relevant advocacy CPI—
that is, Lo ≥ 1,Uo ≤ AL—then the finding is credible evidence for
a positive effect, despite its nonsignificance. On the other hand, the
above expressions for AL show that a finding cannot provide credible
evidence for the hypothesized effect under AnCred if the point value
M lies on the other side of the null line from the hypothesized effect.
Instead, it provides evidence for the opposite effect (e.g., decreased
rather than increased test-scores), and this is credible if it meets the
criteria set by AnCred, this timewith the CPI transformed from (1, AL)
→ (AL, 1).
As with the skepticism CPI, AnCred imposes a conservative bound
on the range of prior evidence needed to provide credible evidence of
a nonzero effect, in this case because the Advocacy CPI has one bound
fixed at no effect. If prior evidence exists for effect sizes substantially
exceeding no effect, this allows the finding to retain credibility for
values beyond AL. Again, those seeking to argue for this must make
their case via a Bayesian analysis specific to the findings and prior
evidence.
Figure A3 summarizes the use of AnCred for both statistically
significant and nonsignificant findings, and shows the impact of
evidence from earlier studies on findings with different weight of
evidence.
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Figure A3. The effect of prior evidence summarized by the interval (Lo , Uo) on the credibility of findings from different studies. For statistically significant findings (A),
if Lo > SLw then the finding is credible evidence of a positive effect whether it came from the stronger or weaker study. If SLs < Lo < SLw , only the finding from the
stronger study achieves credibility under AnCred. If Lo < SLs then demonstration of the credibility of the finding requires a Bayesian analysis specific to the study and prior
evidence. For statistically nonsignificant results (B), findings still provide credible evidence of a nonzero effect if both Lo and Uolie between no effect and ALs in the case of
the stronger study, and ALw for the weaker study. As before, the impact on credibility of prior evidence lying outside these ranges can be assessed using a specific Bayesian
analysis.
A4: The Case of No Relevant Prior Evidence
In the case of entirely novel findings, there may be no obviously rele-
vant prior evidence with which the CPI can be compared to establish
credibility. In such cases, AnCred provides a framework leading to the
assessment of intrinsic credibility (Matthews 2018, sect. 6). Here, the
CPI calculated from the 95% CI is compared to the point value of the
effect size, given by the point value of the CI. The application of AnCred
then proceeds as usual, with the location of this point value relative
to the CPI determining intrinsic credibility. An example is given in
Example 2 of Section 3.
As shown in the above reference, the assessment can be performed
by a simple rule of thumb: entirely novel findings possess intrinsic
credibility if they have p-values less than around 0.01. It should be
stressed, however, that this rule of thumb has no interpretation under
NHST. Lack of intrinsic credibility means simply that the novel finding
in question currently lacks the evidential weight to make its case
without external support. Such support may emerge following publi-
cation of the finding, thus allowing a reassessment of the finding using
AnCred.
Very recently, Held (2018) has developed an alternative approach
to intrinsic credibility which casts intriguing new light on proposals
to lower the threshold for significance of novel findings to p ≤ 0.005
(Benjamin et al. 2018).
A5: Extension of AnCred to Other Inferential Challenges
This article has focused on the application of AnCred in the most
widely used situation encountered in research: the assessment of evi-
dence for nonzero effects expressed as differences in means, propor-
tions, or as ORs. The basic principle of inverting Bayes’ theorem and
deducing the prior needed for posterior credibility at the 95% level can
be applied to other inferential questions, such as the credibility of claims
of worthwhile benefit. However, even with conjugate distributions the
outcome typically lacks the analytic elegance made possible by the
normal distribution, and the use of software packages is likely to be
required for general acceptance by the research community. It is hoped
that such developments will be encouraged by the potential benefits of
using AnCred explored in this article.
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